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Abstract
Classical game theory treats players as
special—a description of a game contains a
full, explicit enumeration of all players—even
though in the real world, “players” are no more
fundamentally special than rocks or clouds. It
isn’t trivial to find a decision-theoretic founda-
tion for game theory in which an agent’s coplay-
ers are a non-distinguished part of the agent’s
environment. Attempts to model both players
and the environment as Turing machines, for
example, fail for standard diagonalization rea-
sons.
In this paper, we introduce a “reflective” type
of oracle, which is able to answer questions
about the outputs of oracle machines with ac-
cess to the same oracle. These oracles avoid
diagonalization by answering some queries ran-
domly. We show that machines with access to
a reflective oracle can be used to define ratio-
nal agents using causal decision theory. These
agents model their environment as a probabilis-
tic oracle machine, which may contain other
agents as a non-distinguished part.
We show that if such agents interact, they will
play a Nash equilibrium, with the randomiza-
tion in mixed strategies coming from the ran-
domization in the oracle’s answers. This can
be seen as providing a foundation for classical
game theory in which players aren’t special.
1 Introduction
Classical decision theory and game theory are founded
on the notion of a perfect Bayesian reasoner [2]. Such
an agent may be uncertain which of several possible
worlds describes the state of its environment, but given
any particular possible world, it is able to deduce ex-
actly what outcome each of its available actions will
produce [3]. This assumption is, of course, unrealis-
tic [4, 5]: Agents in the real world must necessarily
Research supported by the Machine Intelligence Research
Institute (intelligence.org). This is an extended version of
[1].
be boundedly rational reasoners, which make decisions
with finite computational resources. Nevertheless, the
notion of a perfect Bayesian reasoner provides an ana-
lytically tractable first approximation to the behavior
of real-world agents, and underlies an enormous body
of work in statistics [6], economics [7], computer sci-
ence [8], and other fields.
On closer examination, however, the assumption
that agents can compute what outcome each of their
actions leads to in every possible world is troublesome
even if we assume that agents have unbounded comput-
ing power. For example, consider the game of Matching
Pennies, in which two players each choose between two
actions (“heads” and “tails”); if the players choose the
same action, the first player wins a dollar, if they choose
differently, the second player wins. Suppose further
that both players’ decision-making processes are Tur-
ing machines with unlimited computing power. Finally,
suppose that both players know the exact state of the
universe at the time they begin deliberating about the
actions they are going to choose, including the source
code of their opponent’s decision-making algorithm.1
In this set-up, by assumption, both agents know ex-
actly which possible world they are in. Suppose that
they are able to use this information to accurately
predict their opponent’s behavior. Since both play-
ers’ decision-making processes are deterministic Tur-
ing machines, their behavior is deterministic given the
initial state of the world; each player either definitely
plays “heads” or definitely plays “tails”. But neither of
these possibilities is consistent: For example, if the first
player chooses heads and the second player can predict
this, the second player will choose tails, but if the first
player can predict this in turn, it will choose tails, con-
tradicting the assumption that it chooses heads.
The problem is caused by the assumption that given
its opponent’s source code, a player can figure out what
action the opponent will choose. One might think that
it could simply run its opponent’s source code, but if the
opponent does the same, both programs will go into an
infinite loop. Binmore [10], discussing the philosophical
1The technique of quining (Kleene’s second recursion the-
orem [9]) shows that it is possible to write two programs that
have access to each other’s source code.
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justification for game-theoretic concepts such as Nash
equilibrium, puts this problem as follows:
In any case, if Turing machines are used
to model the players, it is possible to sup-
pose that the play of a game is prefixed
by an exchange of the players’ Go¨del num-
bers. . .Within this framework, a perfectly
rational machine ought presumably to be
able to predict the behavior of the opposing
machines perfectly, since it will be familiar
with every detail of their design. And a uni-
versal Turing machine can do this. What it
cannot do is predict its opponents’ behavior
perfectly and simultaneously participate in
the action of the game. It is in this sense
that the claim that perfect rationality is an
unattainable ideal is to be understood.
Even giving the players access to a halting oracle does
not help, because even though a machine with access
to a halting oracle can predict the behavior of an ordi-
nary Turing machine, it cannot in general predict the
behavior of another oracle machine.
Classical game theory resolves this problem by al-
lowing players to choose mixed strategies (probabil-
ity distributions over actions); for example, the unique
Nash equilibrium of Matching Pennies is for each player
to assign “heads” and “tails” probability 0.5 each. How-
ever, instead of treating players’ decision-making algo-
rithms as computable processes which are an ordinary
part of a world with computable laws of physics, clas-
sical game theory treats players as special objects. For
example, to describe a problem in game-theoretic terms,
we must provide an explicit list of all relevant players,
even though in the real world, “players” are ordinary
physical objects, not fundamentally distinct from ob-
jects such as rocks or clouds.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to define
a certain kind of probabilistic oracle—that is, an ora-
cle which answers some queries non-deterministically—
such that a Turing machine with access to this oracle
can perform perfect Bayesian reasoning about environ-
ments that can themselves be described as oracle ma-
chines with access to the same oracle. This makes it
possible for players to treat opponents simply as an or-
dinary part of this environment.
When an environment contains multiple agents
playing a game against each other, the probabilistic be-
havior of the oracle may cause the players’ behavior to
be probabilistic as well. We show that in this case, the
players will always play a Nash equilibrium, and for ev-
ery particular Nash equilibrium there is an oracle that
causes the players to behave according to this equilib-
rium. In this sense, our work can be seen as providing
a foundation for classical game theory, demonstrating
that the special treatment of players in the classical
theory is not fundamental.
The oracles we consider are not halting oracles; in-
stead, roughly speaking, they allow oracle machines
with access to such an oracle to determine the prob-
ability distribution of outputs of other machines with
access to the same oracle. Because of their ability to
deal with self-reference, we refer to these oracles as re-
flective oracles.
2 Reflective Oracles
In many situations, programs would like to predict
the output of other programs. They could simulate
the other program in order to do this. However, this
method fails when there are cycles (e.g. program A is
concerned with the output of program B which is con-
cerned with the output of program A). Furthermore,
if a procedure to determine the output of another pro-
gram existed, then it would be possible to construct a
liar’s paradox of the form “if I return 1, then return 0,
otherwise return 1”.
These paradoxes can be resolved by using probabil-
ities. LetM be the set of probabilistic oracle machines,
defined here as Turing machines which can execute spe-
cial instructions to (i) flip a coin that has an arbitrary
rational probability of coming up heads, and to (ii) call
an oracle O, whose behavior might itself be probabilis-
tic.
Roughly speaking, the oracle answers questions of
the form: “Is the probability that machineM returns 1
greater than p?” Thus, O takes two inputs, a machine
M ∈ M and a rational probability p ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, and
returns either 0 or 1. If M is guaranteed to halt and
to output either 0 or 1 itself, we want O(M,p) = 1 to
mean that the probability that M returns 1 (when run
with O) is at least p, and O(M,p) = 0 to mean that it
is at most p; if it is equal to p, both conditions are true,
and the oracle may answer randomly. In summary,
P(MO() = 1) > p =⇒ P(O(M,p) = 1) = 1
P(MO() = 1) < p =⇒ P(O(M,p) = 0) = 1
where we write P(MO() = 1) for the probability thatM
returns 1 when run with oracle O, and P(O(M,p) = 1)
for the probability that the oracle returns 1 on in-
put (M,p). We assume that different calls to the or-
acle are stochastically independent events (even if they
are about the same pair (M,p)); hence, the behavior
of an oracle O is fully specified by the probabilities
P(O(M,p) = 1).
Definition A query (with respect to a particular ora-
cle O) is a pair (M,p), where p ∈ [0, 1]∩Q andMO() is
a probabilistic oracle machine which almost surely halts
and returns an element of {0, 1}.
Definition An oracle is called reflective on R, where R
is a set of queries, if it satisfies the two conditions dis-
played above for every (M,p) ∈ R. It is called reflective
if it is reflective on the set of all queries.
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Theorem 2.1. (i) There is a reflective oracle.
(ii) For any oracle O and every set of queries R,
there is an oracle O′ which is reflective on R and
satisfies P(O′(M,p) = 1) = P(O(M,p) = 1) for all
(M,p) /∈ R.
Proof. For the proof of (ii), see Appendix B; see also
Theorem 5.1, which gives a more elementary proof of
a special case. Part (i) follows from part (ii) by choos-
ing R to be the set of all queries and letting O be arbi-
trary.
As an example, consider the machine given by
MO() = 1 − O(M, 0.5), which implements a version
of the liar paradox by asking the oracle what it will
return and then returning the opposite. By the exis-
tence theorem, there is an oracle which is reflective on
R = {(M, 0.5)}. This is no contradiction: We can set
P(O(M, 0.5) = 1) = P(O(M, 0.5) = 0) = 0.5, leading
the program to output 1 half the time and 0 the other
half of the time.
3 From Reflective Oracles to Causal
Decision Theory
We now show how reflective oracles can be used to im-
plement a perfect Bayesian reasoner. We assume that
each possible environment that this agent might find
itself in can likewise be modeled as an oracle machine;
that is, we assume that the laws of physics are com-
putable by a probabilistic Turing machine with access
to the same reflective oracle as the agent. For exam-
ple, we might imagine our agent as being embedded
in a Turing-complete probabilistic cellular automaton,
whose laws are specified in terms of the oracle.
We assume that each of the agent’s hypothe-
ses about which environments it finds itself in can
be modeled by a (possibly probabilistic) “world pro-
gram” HO(), which simulates this environment and re-
turns a description of what happened. We can then
define a machine WO() which samples a hypothesis H
according to the agent’s probability distribution and
runs HO(). In the sequel, we will talk aboutWO() as if
it refers to a particular environment, but this machine
is assumed to incorporate subjective uncertainty about
the laws of physics and the initial state of the world.
We further assume that the agent’s decision-making
process, AO(), can be modeled as a probabilistic oracle
machine embedded in this environment. As a simple
example, consider the world program
WO() =
{
$20 if AO() = 0
$15 otherwise
In this world, the outcome is $20 (which in this case
means the agent receives $20) if the agent chooses ac-
tion 0 and $15 if the agent chooses action 1.
Our task is to find an appropriate implementation
of AO(). Here, we consider agents implementing causal
decision theory (CDT) [11], which evaluates actions ac-
cording to the consequences they cause: For example,
if the agent is a robot embedded in a cellular automa-
ton, it might evaluate the expected utility of taking
action 0 or 1 by simulating what would happen in the
environment if the output signal of its decision-making
component were replaced by either 0 or 1.
We will assume that the agent’s model of the coun-
terfactual consequences of taking different actions a is
described by a machine WOA (a), satisfying W
O() =
WOA (A
O()) since in the real world, the agent takes ac-
tion a = AO(). In our example,
WOA (a) =
{
$20 if a = 0
$15 otherwise
We assume that the agent has a utility function over
outcomes, u(·), implemented as a lookup table, which
takes rational values in [0, 1].2 Furthermore, we assume
that both WOA (0) and W
O
A (1) halt almost surely and
return a value in the domain of u(·). Causal decision
theory then prescribes choosing the action that maxi-
mizes expected utility; in other words, we want to find
an AO() such that
AO() = argmax
a
E
[
u
(
WOA (a)
)]
In the case of ties, any action maximizing utility is al-
lowed, and it is acceptable for AO() to randomize.
We cannot compute this expectation by simply run-
ning u(WOA (a)) many times to obtain samples, since the
environment might contain other agents of the same
type, potentially leading to infinite loops. However, we
can find an optimal action by making use of a reflec-
tive oracle. This is easiest when the agent has only two
actions (0 and 1), but similar analysis extends to any
number of actions. Define a machine
EO() := flip
(
u(WOA (1))− u(W
O
A (0)) + 1
2
)
where flip(p) is a probabilistic function that returns 1
with probability p and 0 with probability 1− p.
Theorem 3.1. O is reflective on {(E, 1/2)} if and only
if AO() := O(E, 1/2) returns a utility-maximizing ac-
tion.
Proof. The demand that AO() return a utility-
maxmizing action is equivalent to
E[u(WOA (1))] > E[u(W
O
A (0))] =⇒ A
O() = 1
E[u(WOA (1))] < E[u(W
O
A (0))] =⇒ A
O() = 0
We have
P(EO() = 1) = E
[
u(WOA (1))− u(W
O
A (0)) + 1
2
]
2Since the meaning of utility functions is invariant under
affine transformations, the choice of the particular interval
[0, 1] is no restriction.
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It is not difficult to check that E[u(WOA (1))] ≷
E[u(WOa (0))] iff P(E
O() = 1) ≷ 1/2. Together with
the definition of AO(), we can use this to rewrite the
above conditions as
P(EO() = 1) > 1/2 =⇒ O(E, 1/2) = 1
P(EO() = 1) < 1/2 =⇒ O(E, 1/2) = 0
But this is precisely the definition of “O is reflective on
{(E, 1/2)}”.
In order to handle agents which can choose between
more than two actions, we can compare action 0 to
action 1, then compare action 2 to the best of actions
0 and 1, then compare action 3 to the best of the first
three actions, and so on. Adding more actions in this
fashion does not substantially change the analysis.
4 From Causal Decision Theory to
Nash Equilibria
Since we have taken care to define our agents’ world
models WOA (a) in such a way that they can em-
bed other agents,3 we need not do anything spe-
cial to pass from single-agent to multi-agent settings.
As in the single-agent case, we model the environ-
ment by a program WO() that contains embedded
agent programs AO1 , . . . , A
O
n and returns an outcome.
We can make the dependency on the agent pro-
gram explicit by writing WO() = FO(AO1 (), . . . , A
O
n ())
for some oracle machine FO(· · · ). This allows us
to define machines WOi (ai) := F
O(ai, A
O
−i()) :=
F (AO1 (), . . . , A
O
i−1(), ai, A
O
i+1(), . . . , A
O
n ()), representing
the causal effects of player i taking action ai.
We assume that each agent has a utility func-
tion ui(·) of the same type as in the previous subsection.
Hence, we can define the agent programs AOi () just as
before:
AOi () = O(Ei, 1/2)
EOi () = flip
(
ui(W
O
i (1))− ui(W
O
i (0)) + 1
2
)
Here, each EOi () calls W
O
i (), which calls A
O
j () for each
j 6= i, which refers to the source code of EOj (), but
again, Kleene’s second recursion theorem shows that
this kind of self-reference poses no theoretical prob-
lem [9].
This setup very much resembles the setting of
normal-form games. In fact:
3More precisely, we have only required that WOA (a) al-
ways halt and produce a value in the domain of the utility
function u(·). Since all our agents do is to perform a single
oracle call, they always halt, making them safe to call from
WOA (a).
Theorem 4.1. Given an oracle O, consider the
n-player normal-form game in which the payoff of
player i, given the pure strategy profile (a1, . . . , an),
is E[ui(F
O(a1, . . . , an))]. The mixed strategy profile
given by si := P(A
O
i () = 1) is a Nash equilib-
rium of this game if and only if O is reflective on
{(E1, 1/2), . . . , (En, 1/2)}.
Proof. For (s1, . . . , sn) to be a Nash equilibrium is
equivalent to every player’s mixed strategy being a best
response; i.e., a pure strategy ai can only be assigned
positive probability if it maximizes
E[ui(F
O(ai, A
O
−i()))] = E[ui(W
O
i (ai))]
By an application of Theorem 3.1, this is equivalent to
O being reflective on {(Ei, 1/2)}.
Note that, in particular, any normal-form game with
rational-valued payoffs can be represented in this way
by simply choosing FO to be the identity function. In
this case, the theorem shows that every reflective oracle
(which exists by Theorem 2.1) gives rise to a Nash equi-
librium. In the other direction, Theorem 4.1 together
with Theorem 2.1(ii) show that for any Nash equilib-
rium (s1, . . . , sn) of the normal-form game, there is a
reflective oracle such that P(AOi () = 1) = si.
5 From Nash Equilibria to Reflective
Oracles
In the previous section, we showed that a reflective or-
acle can be used to find Nash equilibria in arbitrary
normal-form games. It is interesting to note that we
can also go in the other direction: For finite sets R satis-
fying certain conditions, we can construct normal-form
gamesGR such that the existence of oracles reflective on
R follows from the existence of Nash equilibria in GR.
This existence theorem is a special case of Theorem 2.1,
but it not only provides a more elementary proof, but
also provides a constructive way of finding such oracles
(by applying any algorithm for finding Nash equilibria
to GR).
Definition A set R of queries is closed if for every
(M,p) ∈ R and every oracle O, MO() is guaranteed to
only invoke the oracle on pairs (N, q) ∈ R. It is bounded
if there is some bound BR ∈ N such that for every
(M,p) ∈ R and every oracle O, MO() is guaranteed to
invoke the oracle at most BR times.
Definition Given a finite set
R = {(M1, p1), . . . , (Mn, pn)} and a
vector ~x ∈ [0, 1]n, define O~x to be the oracle satisfying
P(O~x(Mi, pi) = 1) = xi for i = 1, . . . , n, and
P(O~x(M,p) = 1) = 0 for (M,p) /∈ R.
Theorem 5.1. For any finite, closed, bounded set R =
{(M1, p1), . . . , (Mn, pn)}, there is a normal form game
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GR with m := n · (2BR + 1) players, each of which has
two pure strategies, such that for any Nash equilibrium
strategy profile (s1, . . . , sm), the oracle O~x with ~x :=
(s1, . . . , sn) is reflective on R.
Proof. We divide the n · (2BR +1) players in our game
into three sets: the main players i = 1, . . . , n, the copy
players g(i, j) := j · n + i, and the auxiliary players
h(i, j) := (BR+j)·n+i, for i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , BR.
The mixed strategy si of a main player i will de-
termine the probability that O~x(Mi, pi) = 1. We will
force sg(i,j) = si, i.e., we will force the mixed strategy
of each copy player to equal that of the correspond-
ing main player; thus, the copy players will provide us
with independent samples from the Bernoulli(si) distri-
bution, allowing us to simulate up to BR independent
calls to O(Mi, pi). Finally, the auxiliary players are
used to enforce the constraint sg(i,j) = si, by having
the copy player g(i, j) play a variant of Matching Pen-
nies against the auxiliary player h(i, j).
In order to define the game’s payoff function, note
first that by writing out each possible way that the at
most BR oracle calls of M
O~x
i () might come out, we can
write the probability that this machine returns 1 as a
polynomial,
P(MO~xi () = 1) =
K∑
k=1
ci,k
n∏
i′=1
x
di,k,i′
i′
where di,k,i′ ≤ BR. We want to force the main player i
to choose pure strategy 1 if this probability is strictly
greater than pi, pure strategy 0 if it is strictly smaller.
To do so, we set player i’s payoff function ui(~a) to
ui(~a) =
{∑K
k=1 fi,k(~a), if ai = 1,
pi, otherwise
where
fi,k(~a) =
{
ci,k if ag(i′,j) = 1 ∀1 ≤ i
′ ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ di,k,i′
0 otherwise
Then, assuming we can guarantee sg(i,j) = si, the
expected payoff of strategy 1 to player i is exactly
P(MO~xi () = 1), while the payoff of strategy 0 is always
pi; hence, as desired, the Nash equilibrium conditions
force i to choose 1 if the probability is greater than pi,
0 if it is smaller.
It remains to choose the payoffs
(ug(i,j)(~a), uh(i,j)(~a)) of the copy and auxiliary players.
In order to force sg(i,j) = si, we set these payoffs as
follows:
ai = 0
ah(i,j) = 0 ah(i,j) = 1
ag(i,j) = 0 (1, 0) (0, 0)
ag(i,j) = 1 (0, 1) (1, 0)
ai = 1
ah(i,j) = 0 ah(i,j) = 1
ag(i,j) = 0 (1, 0) (0, 1)
ag(i,j) = 1 (0, 0) (1, 0)
We show in Appendix A that at Nash equilibrium,
these payoffs force sg(i,j) = si.
Theorem 5.1 is a special case of Theorem 2.1(i). The
proof can be adapted to also show an analog of Theo-
rem 2.1(ii), but we omit the details here.
6 Related Work
Joyce and Gibbard [12] describe one justification for
mixed Nash equilibria in terms of causal decision theory.
Specifically, they discuss a self-ratification condition
that extends CDT to cases when one’s action is evidence
of different underlying conditions that might change
which actions are rational. An action self-ratifies if and
only if it causally maximizes expected utility in a world
model that has been updated on the evidence that this
action is taken.
For example, consider the setting of a matching pen-
nies game where players can predict each other accu-
rately. The fact that player A plays “heads” is ev-
idence that player B will predict that player A will
play “heads” and play “tails” in response, so player
A would then have preferred to play “tails”, and so
the “heads” action would fail to self-ratify. However,
the mixed strategy of flipping the coin would self-ratify.
Our reflection principle encodes some global constraints
on players’ mixed strategies that are similar to self-
ratification.
The question of how to model agents as an ordinary
part of the environment is of interest in the speculative
study of human-level and smarter-than-human artifi-
cial intelligence [13, 14]. Although such systems are
still firmly in the domain of futurism, there has been a
recent wave of interest in foundational research aimed
at understanding their behavior, in order to ensure that
they will behave as intended if and when they are de-
veloped [15, 16, 14].
Theoretical models of smarter-than-human intel-
ligence such as Hutter’s universally intelligent agent
AIXI [17] typically treat the agent as separate from the
environment, communicating only through well-defined
input and output channels. In the real world, agents
run on hardware that is part of the environment, and
Orseau and Ring [13] have proposed formalisms for
studying space-time embedded intelligence running on
hardware that is embedded in its environment. Our
formalism might be useful for studying idealized mod-
els of agents embedded in their environment: While
real agents must be boundedly rational, the ability to
study perfectly Bayesian space-time embedded intelli-
gence might help to clarify which aspects of realistic
systems are due to bounded rationality, and which are
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due to the fact that real agents aren’t cleanly separated
from their environment.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have introduced reflective oracles, a
type of probabilistic oracle which is able to answer ques-
tions about the behavior of oracle machines with ac-
cess to the same oracle. We’ve shown that such oracle
machines can implement a version of causal decision
theory, and used this to establish a close relationship
between reflective oracles and Nash equilibria.
We have focused on answering queries about oracle
machines that halt with probability 1, but the reflec-
tion principle presented in Section 2 can be modified to
apply to machines that do not necessarily halt. To do
so, we replace the condition
P(MO() = 1) < p =⇒ P(O(M,p) = 0) = 1
by the condition
P(MO() 6= 0) < p =⇒ P(O(M,p) = 0) = 1
This is identical to the former principle ifMO() is guar-
anteed to halt, but provides sensible information even if
there is a chance that MO() loops. Appendix B proves
the existence of reflective oracles satisfying this stronger
reflection principle.
The ability to deal with non-halting machines opens
up the possibility of applying reflective oracles to sim-
plicity priors such as Solomonoff induction [18], which
defines a probability distribution over infinite bit se-
quences by, roughly, choosing a random program and
running it. Solomonoff induction deals with com-
putable hypotheses, but is itself uncomputable (albeit
computably approximable) because it must deal with
the possibility that a randomly chosen program may go
into an infinite loop after writing only a finite number
of bits on its output tape. A reflective oracle version of
Solomonoff induction would be able to deal with a hy-
pothesis space consisting of arbitrary oracle machines,
while itself being implementable as an oracle machine;
this would make it possible to model a predictor which
predicts an environment it is itself embedded in. We
leave details to future work.
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APPENDIX
A Nash Equilibria in a Variant of
Matching Pennies
Lemma A.1. Consider an n-player game with three
distinguished players, each of which has two pure strate-
gies: Player Row has strategies Up and Down, player
Column has strategies Left and Right, and player Ma-
trix has strategies Front and Back. Suppose that the
payoffs of (Row, Column) depend only on the strategies
of these three players, as follows:
(1, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 1) (1, 0)
(1, 0) (0, 1)
(0, 0) (1, 0)
where the first matrix indicates the payoffs when Matrix
plays Front, and the second matrix indicates the payoffs
when Matrix plays Back.
Write p for the probability that Row plays Down,
and q for the probability that Matrix plays Back. At
Nash equilibrium, we have p = q.
Proof. • Case 1: 0 < q < 1.
Suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium where
Column plays Left. Then Row would play Up, but
then Column would strictly prefer Right, which is
a contradiction.
Suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium where
Column plays Right. Then Row would play
Down, but then Column would strictly prefer
Left, which is a contradiction.
Thus, at every Nash equilibrium, Column must
mix between strategies. Hence, at equilibrium,
Column must be indifferent between Left and
Right. This is equivalent to p(1 − q) = (1 − p)q.
This implies p > 0, since otherwise we’d have
0(1 − q) = (1 − 0)q, i.e. 0 = q, but we assumed
0 < q < 1. Thus, we can divide the equation by
pq, yielding:
(1 − q)/q = (1− p)/p
⇔ 1/x− 1 = 1/p− 1
⇔ 1/q = 1/p
⇔ q = p
• Case 2: q = 0.
This gives us the following payoff matrix:
(1, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 1) (1, 0)
Suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium with p >
0. Then at this equilibrium, Column must play
Left; but if Column plays Left, then Row strictly
prefers Up, which contradicts p > 0. Hence, we
must have p = 0 = q.
• Case 3: q = 1.
This gives us the following payoff matrix:
(1, 0) (0, 1)
(0, 0) (1, 0)
Suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium with
p < 1. Then at this equilibrium, Column must
play Right; but if Column plays Right, then Row
strictly prefers Down, which contradicts p < 1.
Hence, we must have p = 1 = q.
B Proof of the Existence Theorem
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 2.1(ii). Thus,
suppose that R is a set of queries and O is some or-
acle; we want to show the existence of an oracle O′
which is reflective on R and satisfies P(O′(M,p) = 1) =
P(O(M,p) = 1) for all (M,p) /∈ R.
We will describe the behavior of O′ by a pair of
functions, query : M× ([0, 1] ∩ Q) → [0, 1] and eval :
M → [0, 1]. The first of these gives the distribution
of O′, i.e., query(M,p) = P(O′(M,p) = 1). The second
gives the distribution of a machine’s behavior under O′:
IfM almost surely returns either 0 or 1, then eval(M) =
P(MO
′
() = 1).
Function pairs (query, eval) can be seen as elements
of A := [0, 1]M×([0,1]∩Q)×[0, 1]M, which is a convex and
compact subset of the locally convex topological vector
space RM×([0,1]∩Q) ×RM (with the product topology).
We now define a correspondence f : A→ Pow(A), such
that fixed points (query, eval) ∈ f(query, eval) yield or-
acles O′ of the desired form.
We define f by giving a set of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for (query′, eval′) ∈ f(query, eval). We
place three conditions on query′(M,p): If (M,p) ∈ R
and eval(M) > p, then query′(M,p) = 1; if (M,p) ∈ R
and eval(M) < p, then query′(M,p) = 0; and if
(M,p) /∈ R, then query′(M,p) = P(O(M,p) = 1).
To describe the conditions on eval′(M), we will con-
sider the definition of “probabilistic oracle machine” to
include the initial state of the machine’s working tapes,
so that we can view the state of a machine MO() af-
ter one step of computation as a new machine NO().
Then, any machine M can be classified as performing
one of the following operations as its first step of com-
putation: (i) a deterministic computation step, yielding
a new state N , in which case eval′(M) = eval(N); (ii) a
coin flip, yielding a state N with a rational probabil-
ity p and another state N ′ with probability 1 − p, in
which case eval′(M) = p · eval(N) + (1 − p) · eval(N ′);
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(iii) halting, with the output tape containing 0 (in which
case eval′(M) = 0) or 1 (in which case eval′(M) = 1)
or some other output (in which case eval′(M) is ar-
bitrary); or (iv) an invocation of the oracle on a pair
(M ′, p), yielding a new state N if the oracle returns 0
and a different new state N ′ if it returns 1. In the
last case, writing q := query(M ′, p), the condition is
eval′(M) = (1− q) · eval(N) + q · eval(N ′).
Given a fixed point (query, eval) ∈ f(query, eval),
define O′ by P(O′(M,p) = 1) = query(M,p). Then, it
can be shown by induction that for every T ∈ N and
everyM ∈ M, eval(M) is ≥ the probability thatMO
′
()
returns 1 after at most T timesteps, and ≤ the proba-
bility that it returns something other than 0 within this
time bound; in the limit, we obtain
P(MO
′
() = 1) ≤ eval(M) ≤ P(MO
′
() 6= 0)
Together with the conditions on query(M,p), this shows
that
P(MO
′
() = 1) > p =⇒ P(O′(M,p) = 1) = 1
P(MO
′
() = 0) > (1− p) =⇒ P(O′(M,p) = 0) = 1
which is a strengthening of the conditions of Section 2:
it is equivalent in the case whereMO
′
() halts with prob-
ability 1, but provides information even if MO
′
() may
fail to halt.
It remains to be shown that f(·) has a fixed point.
To do so, we employ the infinite-dimensional general-
ization of Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem [19].
It is clear from the definition that f(query, eval) is
non-empty, closed and convex for all (query, eval) ∈ A.
Hence, to show that f has a fixed point, it is sufficient
to show that it has closed graph.
Thus, assume that we have sequences
(queryn, evaln) → (query, eval) and
(query′n, eval
′
n) → (query
′, eval′), such that
(query′n, eval
′
n) ∈ f(queryn, evaln) for every n; we need
to show that then, (query′, eval′) ∈ f(query, eval).
For the conditions on eval′, we can simply take the
limit n→∞ on both sides of each equation. The condi-
tion on query′(M,p) for (M,p) /∈ R is clearly fulfilled,
since query′n(M,p) is constant in this case. The two
remaining conditions on query′(M,p) are entirely sym-
metrical; without loss of generality, consider the case
eval(M) > p, (M,p) ∈ R.
In this case, since (queryn, evaln) → (query, eval)
and convergence is pointwise, there must be an
n0 such that evaln(M) > p for all n ≥ n0.
Since (query′n, eval
′
n) ∈ f(queryn, evaln), it follows
that query′n(M,p) = 1 for all n ≥ n0, whence
query′(M,p) = 1 as desired. This completes the proof.
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